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Foreword
This paper first analyzes how individuals are dealt with in the decision-making process in crisis situations, 
drawing on the rich literature written by Graham Allison, James Richardson and others. Second, it focuses 
on their role in recent IRT, introducing Kenneth Waltz’s three images theory as the starting point, while 
acknowledging that Waltz later asserted that international system analysis is the major IR analytical frame-
work and on this basis established his Neorealism, contradicting major FPA scholars and making it neces-
sary to draw also on contemporary IR scholars who stress the necessity to focus more on the role of indi-
viduals, such as Rosenau, Nicholson, Byman and Pollack. Third, the paper introduces Constructivism as 
asserted by Alexander Wendt, observing that it gives individuals a greater place in IRT while refraining 
from a parsimonious application of it. Next, this paper argues that Eclecticism, combining the wisdom ob-
tained by Realism, Liberalism and Constructivism, integrates best FPA and IRT by way of bringing power, 
values / efficiency and identity into the analytical framework.
Last, the paper applies the theoretical framework as outlined in the above-mentioned survey to recent 
Japanese politics, namely, the Japan Democratic Party (JDP)’s victory in August 2009 in the House of 
Representatives election and Yukio Hatoyama’s ascendancy to power.
Introduction to Traditional International Relations Theory on Individuals
The study of international affairs is fundamentally a study of states and relations among states. But states 
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are composed of individuals. The international system, which is composed of states, is therefore con-
structed of individuals, meaning that to some extent the role of individuals in the study of international 
affairs cannot be excluded. This applies both to Realism and Liberalism, which concede the relevance of 
individuals. In particular, realists observe that human nature is power-seeking and evil, which in no way 
denies the role of individuals. Machiavelli, one of the first realist thinkers of international affairs, made 
one of the most eloquent and precise observations on the nature and importance of individuals, capable of 
acting on the basis of their free will.
 “However the free will of individuals cannot be deprived of. Even if destiny can freely preside over 
half of individuals’ activities, at least destiny leaves to our own discretion half or nearly half of the 
outstanding individuals’ activities. This is the reality as I see it (Machiavelli 1532 / 1975, 143).” 
Hans Morgenthau illustrated lucidly that it was the ability of statesmen, not his motives, that makes a 
policy success or not, underlying the importance of individuals in charge:
 “What is important to know, if one wants to understand foreign policy, is not primarily the motives of 
a statesman, his intellectual ability to comprehend the essentials of foreign policy, as well as his po-
litical ability to translate what he has comprehended into successful political action (Morgenthau 
1978 / 1985, 6).” 
In general, Liberals have placed more focus on the role of individuals. Since Liberals believe that human 
nature is fundamentally good and consider that the world may be transformed by the actions of individu-
als, emphasis on the individual is a natural conclusion. In his article “Individuals, Individualism and World 
Politics” in Individualism and World Politics (1999) Michel Girard states that Liberal Enlightenment think-
ing clarified the role of individuals in international affairs. Girard argues that all kinds of theories from 
Grotius’s concept of international law to nineteenth-century thinking ranging from Kant, Cobden, Proud-
hon, and even Marx have “contributed to keep open the question of the place and role of the individual in 
world politics.” The first half of the 20th century, particularly 1918-1930, saw “a strong comeback of an 
idealism which favoured the individualistic approach (both Girard 1999, 8).” 1)
The overall picture of individuals grew more complicated in the 1980s under the influence of Neoreal-
ists and Neoliberals, whose emphasis on ‘structures’ and ‘institutions’ marginalized the role of individuals 
in international affairs, albeit to a different degree. In the case of Neorealists, since Waltz’s major conten-
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tion was that anarchy possesses a ‘structural’ character, the role of individuals in the decision-making 
process became less important. In his Theory of International Politics (1979) he hardly deals with indi-
viduals2). The Neoliberals recognized that through a learning process cooperation could lead to institu-
tions. Keohane wrote in 1984 that “Sophisticated students of institutions and rules view institutions as 
‘recognized patterns of practice around which expectations converge (Young 1980, 337)’ and they regard 
these patterns of practice as significant because they affect state behavior (Keohane 1984 / 2005, 8).” 
Against the prevalence of Neo-Neo theories, which brought about ‘deterministic’ thinking in the analysis 
of international relations, there emerged three new directions to focus on the importance of individuals, 
particularly after the end of the Cold War: 1) more attention to another academic discipline that could be 
defined as Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) ; 2) spread of IRT, which focused more on the role of individuals; 
and 3) rise of Constructivism, leading to theoretical Eclecticism.
The Role of Individuals in Foreign Policy Analysis
Foreign Policy in a Crisis Situation
Whereas the study of International Relations, from the time of Thucydides to this day, primarily dealt with 
the issue concerning the nature and characteristics of the international system and the key issue of why 
certain actions are taken by states, FPA concentrates on the process of decision-making in a state. It there-
fore takes for granted the role of individuals, because decisions are taken by individuals in all interna-
tional affairs.
FPA may be divided into two parts: in a normal situation or in a crisis situation. The analysis of For-
eign Policy under normal conditions is usually covered by the analysis of diplomacy. But it is Foreign 
Policy in a crisis situation that places more focus on the role of individuals in the decision-making process. 
Crisis may be defined as “an acute conflict between two or more states, associated with a specific issue and 
involving a perception by decision-makers of a serious risk of war (Richardson 1994, 12).” In comparison 
to diplomacy, in a crisis situation there is a clear new factor ‘risk of war’. This means not only negotiations, 
but also the possible or actual use of force becomes an integral part of the analysis. In a crisis situation, 
the outcome of the leaders’ decisions therefore becomes much clearer, namely in the form of war or 
peace.
Graham Allison and James Richardson in the Analysis of FP in a Crisis Situation
Graham Allison’s work Essence of Decision, Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (1971) may be considered 
The Role of Individuals in International Relations Theory66
as laying the foundation for subsequent work on the analysis of Foreign Policy in a crisis situation. The 
book addresses the Cuban missile crisis, which was perhaps the single most dangerous incident that 
brought the world close to WWIII. But most importantly, the book introduces three models of decision-
making, which serve as a basis to analyze other crises from the Foreign Policy perspective. The three 
models of analysis are the Rational Actor Model, the Organisational Behaviour Model and the Govern-
mental Politics Model.
Irving Janis carries forward Graham Allison’s analysis in his Groupthink (1972) , noting that “Allison 
presents the three approaches as conceptual models to help social scientists generate hypotheses and 
discern important features that might otherwise be overlooked when they are trying to explain how and 
why a new foreign policy decision came about (Janis 1982, 7).” The group dynamics approach introduced 
by Janis should be considered as a fourth conceptual approach in addition to Allison’s three approaches.
In his Analogies at War (1992) , Yuen Foong Khong analyses US decision-making in 1965 vis-à-vis 
Vietnam. He focuses on the issue of why and how the US decision to become involved in Vietnam was 
taken and argues that a comparative analysis of options open to the decision-makers is useful in order to 
understand why and how certain decisions were taken, while stating that “those who believe that decision-
making theories are essential to understanding international politics have a rich vein to mine here (Khong 
1992, 55).” He then remarks, “The most systematic expression of the options-based approach is Graham 
Allison’s Essence of Decision. Allison’s work has become a classic in foreign policy studies in part because 
it frames the problem ingeniously. … Allison wants to explain why the blockade option was selected over 
the other five options. … [I] t is difficult to deny that focusing on the fates of the various options allows 
Allison to conduct a theoretically rich investigation (Khong 1992, 56).” 
James Richardson’s Crisis Diplomacy, The Great Powers since the Mid-Nineteenth Century (1994) is a 
landmark monograph on Foreign Policy in crisis situations, theoretically synthesizing past analyses based 
on empirical research on major crises in international relations since the middle of the 19th century. He 
applies five theoretical assumptions to the decision-making process of crisis diplomacy, which, in turn, can 
be related to the three models developed by Allison:
● Theory of rational choice (Richardson) –Rational Actor Model I (Allison) 
●  Impaired rationality: organisational and political theories (Richardson) –Organisational Behaviour 
Model II and Governmental Politics Model III (Allison) 
● Psychological theories of impaired rationality (only Richardson) 
● Theories of adversary interaction (supplementary analysis in Richardson) 
● Systemic and deterministic theories (lynchpin of IR theories in Richardson) 
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Rational Actor Model
Allison’s Rational Actor Model is based on the assumption that decision-makers act rationally, the focus of 
the analysis being the ends the political actors want to achieve and the policy measures used to achieve 
these ends. The crucial point here is the rationality between the objectives to achieve national interests 
and the measures to achieve these objectives. Allison pointed out that in the decision-making that led to 
the crisis and finally ended that crisis in Cuba, both in Moscow and Washington there was this rationality. 
But when one assumes that behind this model there is an international system of anarchy, and then looks 
at the rationality of individuals in relation to this anarchy, this model may be connected to the systemic 
analysis of International Relations. As we will see later, the discourse between Alison and Kenneth Waltz 
opens on this point.
Richardson’s theory of rational choice acknowledges Allison’s RAM: “We may follow Graham Allison 
in seeing rational-actor theories as the typical mode of explaining foreign policy decisions, by scholars and 
laymen alike, and in identifying their ‘trademark’ as ‘the attempt to explain international events by re-
counting the aims and calculations of nations and governments’ … but he allows for variants of his basic 
model, including one － especially relevant for the present study － in which the rational actor is the indi-
vidual decision-maker (Richardson 1994, 14).” 
Richardson further elaborates that a strict rational theory that assumes perfect rational choices does 
not seem to conform to reality, and that rather the informal rational choices which have a broader basis 
for policy choices seem to be closer to reality. “To say that truth is necessary for rational beliefs clearly is 
to require too much; to say that consistency is sufficient, is to demand too little. … The concept may be 
used both normatively and descriptively. Used normatively, for example, it enjoins individuals and institu-
tions to adopt procedures whereby important decisions are made on a thorough assessment of the rele-
vant information. Used descriptively, it refers to the extent to which particular actors are found to meet 
this and like criteria for rationality. (Richardson 1994, 357).” 
Organisational Behaviour Model and Governmental Politics Model
Allison argues that his Models II and III, namely the Organisational Behaviour Model and Governmental 
Politics Model, emphasise factors that affect rational decision-making in any country. These factors are all 
related to internal politics and division of interests within a country. By definition, organisational rigidities 
and limitations condition the decision-making of respective leaders. Domestic and local bureaucratic poli-
tics condition Foreign Policy decision-making.
Allison further argues that the Rational Actor Model, his Model I, is crucial to the analysis, but once 
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combined with the Organisational Behaviour Model and Governmental Politics Model, one can obtain a 
deeper and more holistic understanding of how and why Cuban the missile crisis happened. All decisions 
were ultimately taken by Khrushchev and Kennedy. Model I (RAM) focuses on the nature and quality of 
the ‘reasoning’ which took place inside these two individuals. Models II and III either focus on domestic 
organisations or on internal or local bureaucracy, thus influencing, conditioning or hampering their rea-
soning.
Richardson’s factor ‘Impaired rationality: organisational and political theories’ is completely in line 
with Allison’s Models II and III. The line of logic is almost identical: “organizational and political condi-
tions inherent in collective action” can impair “the rationality of politics and outcomes (Richardson 1994, 
18-19).” However, Richardson cautions that the line between the first model of rationality and the second 
and third models of organisational and political irrationality is not sharply drawn. Graham Allison’s analy-
sis may create an impression of rationality in Model I (RAM) and irrationality in Models II and III. “The 
presumption that collective decision-making leads to irrationality, however, is challenged by Snyder and 
Diesing’s finding that collective decision-making structures achieved greater rationality than decisions 
taken by a single leader, alone or in consultation with a key adviser (Richardson 1994, 18-19).” 
Perceptual and Psychological Aspects
Irving Janis defines groupthink as “a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply in-
volved in a cohesive in-group, when the members’strivings for unanimity override their motivation to re-
alistically appraise alternative courses of action (Janis 1982, 9).” Errors committed by individuals may be 
greatly augmented by a group process that produces shared miscalculations (Janis 1982, 6-7). In connec-
tion with Allison’s three models, the groupthink model can be understood as one more internal or domes-
tic factor that conditions rational thinking. At the same time, it is a factor which emphasises the percep-
tions of leaders and the small group surrounding and influencing the leader. Allison’s organisational and 
bureaucratic Models II and III are more focused on structural impediments within a state. Groupthink is 
also structural in the sense that it is based on the formation of a group within political organisations. How-
ever, the major focus of the analysis is psychological and perceptional.
Yuen Foong Khong’s Analogies at War (1992) is another analysis focusing on the psychology and 
perception of leaders and their teams. Or, to be more precise, the primary focus of his analysis is the US 
decision-making in 1965 in connection with its involvement in Vietnam. The chief analytical tool utilised 
by Khong is Analogical Explanation (AE) : “Simply stated, the AE framework suggests that analogies are 
cognitive devices that ‘help’ policymakers perform six diagnostic tasks central to political decision-mak-
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ing. Analogies (1) help define the nature of the situation confronting the policymaker, (2) help assess the 
stakes, and (3) provide prescriptions. They help evaluate alternative options by (4) predicting their chanc-
es of success, (5) evaluating their moral rightness, and (6) warning about dangers associated with the 
options (Khong 1992, 10).” In a powerful case analysis based on AE, Khong showed that the Korean War 
and Munich formed the basis of the American decision toward greater involvement in 1965. According to 
Khong, had an AE based on Dien Bien Phu been adopted, US decision-making could have taken a substan-
tially different form. Thus, analogies serve as a fundamental basis for decision-making.
One of the five principles advanced by Richardson is ‘Psychological theories of impaired rationality’. 
Allison does not single out psychological factors. In this respect Richardson’s analysis of decision-making 
in international affairs is definitely richer than the analysis made by Allison. Richardson for instance also 
refers to Ole Holsti’s argument that psychological stress, in particular time pressure and the tendency to 
concentrate on “the immediate rather than the long-range consequences of action (Richardson 1994, 17)” 
can seriously affect the rationality of decision-making.
The Role of Individuals in the Recent International Relations Theory
Waltz’s Three Images Theory and the Alienation of Decision Analysis
Waltz’s preoccupation with the structure of the international system shifted the focus away from Foreign 
Policy decision analysis. This is ironic and somewhat tragic, because Waltz started his International Rela-
tions analysis with his three images theory, an important breakthrough concept that gave individuals a 
stable position in the IRT.
Waltz developed his three images theory in Man, the State and War, published in 1954. He called 
them ‘images’, but they could also be called ‘layers’. The first ‘image’ was individuals, the second ‘image’ 
was states seen from internal perspectives or factors, and the third ‘image’ was the international system 
composed by states. Waltz claimed the superiority of the third ‘image’, concluding that the actions of 
states are based on power considerations in the international system, which is fundamentally anarchic: 
“[The third image] reveals why, in the absence of tremendous changes in the factors included in the first 
and second images, war will be perpetually associated with the existence of separate sovereign states 
(Waltz 1954 / 2001, 237-238).” 
The superiority of the third image, grasping the essence of the international system, led Waltz to de-
fine the first and second images as factors which limit the exogenous analysis of the international system: 
“The theories of international politics that concentrate causes of individual or national level are reduction-
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ist; theories that conceive of causes operating at the international level as well are systemic. … With a 
reductionist approach, the whole is understood by knowing the attributes and interactions of its parts 
(Waltz 1979, 18).” 
Waltz’s view that international system analysis alone is able to deal with the whole and that the indi-
vidual and national levels of analysis can only partially cover all aspects of decision-making, had a pro-
found impact on the IRT thereafter. It relegated ‘decisions’ to a secondary position in the IR analysis, it 
turned the focus away from individuals who are key actors in decision-making, and it established the su-
premacy of the ultimate exogenous structure of the whole, namely the international system.
Waltz versus Richardson
Richardson’s systemic analysis is very different from Waltz’s somewhat restricted analysis of system 
structure. Richardson starts his analysis with the systemic theories which developed among IR scholars: 
“Among systemic theories, we may distinguish between parsimonious theories of the system structure in 
Waltz’s sense ( ‘the number of major actors and the gross distribution of military power among them’ ) and 
those which may be termed the historical sociology of international systems, developed by historians 
such as F.H. Hinsley and Paul Schroeder, which differentiate among systems in terms of multiple criteria, 
giving weight to normative as well as structural considerations. … Many historians ... assume that leaders 
exercise genuine choice, thus aligning themselves with the ‘decision-making’ rather than the ‘state-as-ac-
tor’ theorists (Richardson 1994, 21-22).” 
Richardson gives a detailed analysis of ‘the historical sociology of international systems’. He dis-
tances himself from Waltz’s deterministic system analysis, outlining the changing arena, alignments and 
norms to identify the nature of the respective system as factors surrounding each crisis. “The most prom-
inent contemporary theory of the international system, Waltz’s neo-realist theory of systemic structure, 
has limited relevance to the present inquiry (Richardson 1994, 351).” 
Thus the rift between Waltz and Richardson is profound. But if one compares the way their analysis 
is constructed, there is also a parallel to be seen. The first of Richardson’s three major criteria of crisis 
analysis is rational theory (formal or informal) , which evaluates the rationality of decision-making. One 
factor taken into consideration in the decision-making process is the state of the international system. The 
significance is very different, but there is a parallel to Waltz’s third image of the international system. 
Richardson’s second criterion of decision-making is the psychology of the individual, again showing a 
clear parallel to Waltz’s first image of individuals. Finally, Richardson’s third criterion, the organisational 
and political factor, is a distinct parallel to Waltz’s second image of the internal political situation.
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Richardson does not claim superiority of his analysis of decision-making in a crisis situation over the 
IRT. In contrast, Waltz maintains that only the analysis of the international system reaches the holistic 
structure of international affairs, treating decision-making analysis, which boils down to individuals or 
national state analyses as reductionist. For Richardson, however, in the decision-making process the indi-
viduals and national state analyses are equally important as the rationality analysis, meaning that at this 
point Waltz and Richardson inevitably drift apart.
Waltz versus Allison
In order to further understand the outlook of Waltz on the IRT we consider his view on Graham Allison: 
“Graham Allison betrays a similar confusion. His three models purport to offer alternative approaches to 
the study of international politics. Only model I, however, is an approach to the study of international 
politics. Models II and III are approaches to the study of foreign policy. Offering the bureaucratic-politics 
approaches as an alternative to the state-as-an-actor approach is like saying that a theory of the firm is an 
alternative to a theory of the market, a mistake no competent economist would make (Waltz 1979, 122).” 
This statement needs careful evaluation. First, does Graham Allison claim to present an alternative to 
the study of international politics? Graham Allison’s analysis of the classical theory of International Rela-
tions is justly famous. It is short, but it includes major aspects of Classical Realism, Neorealism (Struc-
tural Realism) , International Institutionalism, and Liberalism in the discussion (Allison 1999, 26-48). The 
analysis seems to cover these -isms so well that it almost pretends to be an alternative to these -isms. But 
in fact it is not. When it comes to the point of linking these classical theories to the RAM (Rational Actor 
Model) , which is the focal point of Allison’s writing, he just states that: “In its simplest form, the RAM 
links purpose and action. … The full RAM includes not only objectives but also calculations about the situ-
ation in which the actor finds himself (Allison 1999, 49).” 
Second, why does Waltz argue that Model I is the study of international politics, whereas Models II 
and III are approaches to the study of foreign policy? I argue that this assertion cannot be accepted by 
Allison, who evenly deals with the three models. “In attempting to explain what happened, each distin-
guished certain features as the relevant determinants. Each combed out the numerous details in a limited 
number of causal strands that were woven into the most important ‘reasons’ for what happened (Allison 
1999, 379).” The three factors are mutually reinforcing, so why should one belong to the category of inter-
national politics and the others to Foreign Policy?
Waltz sees in Allison’s RAM a reflection of the anarchic structure of the international system. But 
from Allison’s point of view, that aspect is not a testimony to the international system as argued by Waltz. 
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It is just RAM explaining the causality of ‘purpose and action’. Leaders want to achieve certain ends, while 
perceiving the international system in a certain way. This perception becomes an important driver behind 
their decisions and actions. Allison, therefore, counter-argues that it is Waltz’s preconception of structural 
systemic Neorealism which distorts his view on Allison:
 “Waltz’s claim that a bright line divides “a systematic theory of international politics” from a “theory 
of foreign policy” , is mistaken. Waltz asserts that it is an “error to mistake a theory of international 
politics for a theory of foreign policy” , that “international politics is not foreign policy.” But in fact … 
“the subject of systemic theories in their original domain is and should be states’ foreign policies and 
their consequences”.Only by perverse definition can the claim that these are sharply distinct do-
mains be defended (Allison 1999, 404).” 
Recent Emphasis on the Role of Individuals in the IR Theories
At the time when the major orientations of IR analysis were dominated by Neo-Neo theories, each of which 
concentrated on structure or institutions and paid less attention to the role of individuals in the IRT, some 
scholars proposed that more attention should be given to their role.
Because Waltz had advocated the predominance of the third image, the anarchic international sys-
tem, the scholars who supported the importance of individuals in the IRT used him as their springboard 
to clarify their own position. This applies to James Rosenau, whose analysis was done from the perspective 
of globalisation, and to Michael Nicholson, who started from the perspective of changing political struc-
ture. Daniel Byman and Kenneth Pollack even straightforwardly challenged Waltz’s neglect of individu-
als.
James Rosenau versus Waltz
In 1990, in the changing political climate at the end of the Cold War, James Rosenau published a book 
entitled Turbulence in World Politics, a Theory of Change and Continuity. This book looks at international 
affairs from a new perspective. The main focus of Rosenau’s analysis could be summarised as a change of 
actors. Rosenau studies the changes that are taking place in the post-Cold War era, influenced by the in-
formation technology revolution. In this constellation, one conspicuous factor in Rosenau’s view is the 
growing importance of the role of individuals in the conduct of international affairs. Michel Girard argues 
that this is “a book about world politics in which individuals occupy an absolutely central position (Girard 
1999, 10).” 
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Rosenau analyses the fundamental changes from the old paradigm to the new paradigm in his study 
of structures of world politics. The old paradigm is “the premise of state predominance and constantly 
tempted to cling to familiar assumptions about hierarchy, authority, and sovereignty. … The work of Ken-
neth Waltz exemplifies this position.” Then Rosenau quotes amply from Waltz’s Theory of International 
Politics, arguing that: “As Waltz sees it, this structural predominance of states is sufficient to obviate the 
need for theorizing afresh (both Rosenau 1990, 244-245).” Rosenau observes that world politics are facing 
a fundamental change, engulfed by turbulence. This requires a new paradigm. “The result is a paradigm 
that neither circumvents nor negates the state-centric model, but preserves it in a larger context, one that 
posits sovereignty-bound and sovereignty-free actors as inhabitants of separate worlds that interact in 
such a way as to make their coexistence possible (Rosenau, 1990, 246).” This leads us to the core of 
Rosenau’s analysis: the actors’ analysis, a masterpiece showing how individuals began to play a more 
crucial role, due to information technology and globalisation.
Rosenau introduces the notion of actors at micro- and macrolevels. Microactors are defined as (1) 
citizens, members, (2) officials, leaders, (3) private actors3). Macroactors are defined as (4) states, (5) 
subgroups, (6) transnational organisations, (7) leaderless public, and (8) movements (Rosenau 1990, 119). 
Rosenau states that the abovementioned turbulence accounts for some fundamental changes occurring 
with these micro- and macroactors. What kinds of changes are taking place? In the analysis of this turbu-
lence-induced micro-macrotransformation, changes are occurring in the role of individuals in interna-
tional affairs. There are four factors involved: (1) authority and legitimacy of leaders, (2) loyalty of mem-
bers, (3) analytical skills of individuals, (4) and the capacity to attach emotion to issues and care about a 
preferred solution (Rosenau 1990, 236-241). Then Rosenau makes an important observation, namely that 
due to the microelectronic revolution there emerged a simultaneous coherence and breakdown of macro-
factors. Then his observation continues, stating that behind this collapse of macrofactors, the microfac-
tors are seriously affected: “One is thus led to hypothesize that another part of the explanation lies in the 
changing orientations of citizens and officials fostered by the changing skills they have acquired in the 
postindustrial era – that dynamism at the microlevel is a source of macropatterns (Rosenau 1990, 240-
241).” 
In such a situation the four elements as quoted above will be subject to changes (1) in legitimacy, 
from ‘traditional criteria’ to ‘performance criteria’, (2) in political loyalty, once ‘focused on nation-state’ and 
shifting to ‘variable foci’, (3) in analytical skills, from ‘rudimentary’ to ‘developed’, (4) in cathectic capaci-
ties, from ‘dormant and crude’ to ‘active and refined’ (descriptions from Rosenau 1990, 211).
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Michael Nicholson versus Waltz and Rosenau
Michael Nicholson’s article “Individuals and Their Influence on the International System” in Individual-
ism and World Politics (1999) also discusses the role of individuals in the changing situation after the end 
of the Cold War, clarifying the circumstances in which relevant individuals change history. Nicholson 
distinguishes three basic systems of international relations. In the first system the actors are fixed and the 
rules are clear. The second system has the potential to include more actors. The third system is based on 
the second, albeit, in reality, there are not that many actors willing to participate.
According to Nicholson, the first system shows the greatest similarity to Waltz’s analysis: “type one 
system is the system exemplified by the model of perfect competition in economics (or the Waltzian 
model in international relations).” After analysing the perfect competition model in economics, Nicholson 
concludes that: “Waltz’s analysis of the international system is rather similar. The actions of individuals as 
a group determine the system, and it is only in terms of the system that the behaviour of individual states 
can be understood properly. It follows that, even if the state is ruled by an absolute monarch or an absolute 
dictator, the range of choice is very limited and even these privileged individuals have no effective control 
over the system (both Nicholson 1999, 31-32).” But Nicholson starts with the premise that individuals 
matter in the actions taken by states: “Those who are not complete structuralists believe that decisions are 
at times real and have consequences which could have been otherwise (Nicholson 1999, 28).” In Nichol-
son’s view, in an absolute monarchy, totalitarian dictatorship, or specific cases when an elected leader gets 
absolute power in democratic regimes, the individuals at the helm of society do matter (Nicholson 1999, 
27-28).
Then Nicholson analyses the post-Cold War international situation. He basically sees an emergence 
of the type two system, while concluding that turbulence and uncertainty have increased. He shares some 
of the fundamental premises proposed by Rosenau, observing that the contemporary political world is one 
of turbulence: “This increase in turbulence in the international system has been noted and analyzed by 
James Rosenau (Nicholson, 1999, 23).” Nicholson furthermore concurs with Rosenau about the increase 
in the number of actors: “Following Rosenau, I am accepting that the world consists of many more actors 
than hitherto. Further these actors are heterogeneous in kind. … But the sheer size and range of the in-
teractions in the present international system means that it is harder for a decision taker to predict the 
consequences of any action. … Thus, though it is easier for individuals to enter and act within the current 
international system than earlier times, the uncertainty reduces the efficacy of the actions, and indeed the 
actions of all other people within the system. This is what I shall call the paradox of participations (Nich-
olson 1999, 35-36).” Nicholson’s greater interest was people in less formal political roles. But the above-
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mentioned ‘paradox of participations’ applies equally to all individuals, including those who are at the 
centre of the policy decision-making process.
But then how can one resolve this ‘paradox of participations’ in the contemporary international situ-
ations? One way of looking at it is to consider a type of society “where the system offers opportunities, but 
where the number of potential actors is small and thus they may not be taken up (Nicholson 1999, 31).” 
This is Nicholson’s type three system, the type where an opportunity comes up that may be seized by an 
individual who has the power and the will to achieve relevance and meaning. He introduces a new concept 
of ‘switch points’ to indicate an unstable situation where one small factor, such as the personality of the 
decision-maker, may produce substantial changes (Nicholson 1999, 39-40).
Daniel Byman and Kenneth Pollack versus Waltz
Daniel Byman and Kenneth Pollack’s article “Let us now praise great men: Bringing the statesman back 
in” (International Security, 2001) is another study, fully exploring and emphasising the importance of indi-
viduals in international affairs. It provides an empirical survey of the individuals who mattered in history: 
Adolf Hitler, Otto von Bismarck and William II, Napoleon Bonaparte, Saddam Hussein, Hafez al-Assad, 
and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. For each of these individuals, the authors give a description of how the 
international situation changed because of actions (or non-actions) he took. Without their personal action 
the outcome of international relations would have been different.
From a theoretical point of view, the most important observation made by Byman and Pollack is to 
refute Waltz’s contention on the structural determinism of the international system. Byman and Pollack 
are ready to acknowledge that Waltz discovered and defined the role of individuals as the first image of 
analysis in his ground-breaking book Man, the State, and War. At the same time, however, Byman and 
Pollack summarise Waltz’s argument that the first image cannot provide an adequate explanation for in-
ternational relations, because human nature is a constant, whereas international relations vary. Byman 
and Pollack profoundly object to the view expressed that human nature is constant, maintaining that: 
“Waltz argues that if human nature is constant, the behavior of nations—the example he employs is war 
making—should also be constant. That is, nations should always be at war. Because nations are not always 
at war, Waltz’s claims cannot possibly explain why nations go to war. On this point, Waltz is simply mis-
taken: Human nature is not a constant; it is a variable.” They then argue that men and women can be evil 
but also good, and that they have mixed traits with tremendous variance. Because individuals differ, they 
will make different decisions and different choices. Individuals are naturally influenced by outside factors, 
but ultimately there is freedom of choice, and the entailing responsibility: “It is entirely possible that vari-
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ance in the traits of individuals explains differences in international relations (Byman and Pollack 2001, 
111-112).” 
Byman and Pollack add two important theoretical points to the existing theories on personality traits 
and the conditions that make individuals matter. Concerning personality traits, the authors attempt to 
deduce concrete observations as to the kinds of personalities and the kinds of results produced by them 
in international relations, leading to four conclusions: “ (1) states led by risk-tolerant leaders are more 
likely to cause wars; (2) states led by delusional leaders start wars and prolong them unnecessarily; (3) 
states led by leaders with grandiose visions are more likely to destabilize the system; (4) states led by 
predictable leaders will have stronger and more enduring alliances (Byman and Pollack 2001, 137-139).” 
When it came to the subject of conditions that make individuals matter, the authors analysed the specific 
situations in which the impact of leaders leads to greater consequences: “ (1) the more power is concen-
trated in the hands of an individual leader, the greater the influence of that leader’s personality and prefer-
ences (Byman and Pollack 2001, 140).” In this context, when institutions surrounding the leaders are 
strong, the power of these leaders diminishes, whereas if institutions are weak (as in authoritarian re-
gimes) the power of leaders will grow. “ (2) Individuals are more important when systemic, domestic and 
bureaucratic forces conflict or are ambiguous; (3) individuals are more important when circumstances are 
fluid (Byman and Pollack 2001, 141-142).” 
Synthesizing under Constructivism and Eclecticism
Rise of Constructivism
Sometime from the end of the 1980’s, the world faced a fundamental change: the end of the Cold War and 
the advent of globalization. Marxism and its materialistic determinism waned, and instead, there emerged 
a new IRT, which probably matched better the dynamic and confused scenery after the end of the Cold 
War and the advent of globalization. This new IRT is Constructivism.
Constructivism first emerged from the reflectivism-positivism debate. Reflectivism first developed in 
philosophy rather than IRT and the key issue was epistemology (defined as ‘how we can claim to know 
things’ ) (Smith, 2001, 224-42). Traditional mainstream IRT, such as neo-realism and neo-liberalism, is 
based on rationalist thinking, best represented by positivist thinking4). Reflectivists cast serious doubt on 
this positivist thinking.
Constructivism advanced primarily by Alexander Wendt claims to have bridged this gap between 
reflectivists and rationalists-positivists. (1) Wendt discusses the state, power, institutions, and the interna-
The Role of Individuals in International Relations Theory 77
tional system, i.e. all issues which are addressed by major Neo-Neo IR positivist scholars. (2) Wendt takes 
the side of Neoliberal institutionalism against Neorealist structuralism. An exogenous international sys-
tem characterized by anarchy is not Wendt’s view. “Anarchy is what states make of it (Wendt, 1992, 395)”.
He sides with the liberal claims that institutions can transform the structure of international system: “on 
behalf of the liberal claim that international institutions can transform state identities and interests...my 
strategy for building this bridge would be to argue against the neo-realist claim that self-help is given by 
anarchic structure exogenously to process... (Wendt, 1992, 394).” (3) But for Wendt, the most important 
factor to unite and run the state emerges only through process, practices and interaction among state ac-
tors. ‘Ideas’ which are formed through this process, practices and interaction are therefore socially con-
structed. “In sum, the ontology of international life that I have advanced is ‘social’ in the sense that it is 
through ideas that states ultimately relate to one other, and “constructionist” in the sense that these ideas 
help define who and what states are (Wendt, 1999, 372).” (4) Through inter-subjective practices among 
actors, a state reaches its own identity and takes decisions in order to achieve its interests on that basis. 
Wendt defines ‘identities’ as “relatively stable, role-specific understanding and expectations about self 
(Wendt, 1992, 397).” 
The basic definition of Constructivism that “it is through ideas that states ultimately relate to one 
other” presupposes the inevitable role of individuals in the whole process of states’ actions. Ideas exist in 
the minds of individuals. Key factors which guide the ideas of the leaders and other decision makers are 
“identities and interests” , and “identities and interests” in Constructivists’ thinking are inseparable from 
the individuals who perceive them. It seems to me that Constructivism, therefore, offers the strongest 
basis to incorporate the role of individuals into the IRT.
Eclecticism
Constructivism is now one of the three major schools of IRT, and it has become incorporated into Eclecti-
cism. Eclecticism does not accept any single IRT as providing a holistic explanation of the world. Eclecti-
cists argue that the synthetic approach combining Realism (Neorealism) , Liberalism (Neoliberalism) and 
Constructivism allows scholars, researchers, policy makers and the general public to understand what, 
why and how things are happening in international affairs. Power, values / efficiency and identity are all 
understood as key factors guiding the actions of states. Refuting one theory as having decisive analytical 
power, Katzenstein argues that: “History is not a series of deviations from a ‘natural’state of stable or un-
stable affairs. Rather it is an open-ended process in which the accumulation of events and experience from 
one period alters the contours of the next. Nothing about this process is ‘natural’ unless we permit our 
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analytic perspectives to make it so (Katzenstein and Okawara 2004, 99).” 
Jae Jung Suh, Peter J. Katzenstein and Allen Carlson applied Eclecticism most decisively to the situ-
ation in East Asia in Rethinking Security in East Asia, Identity, Power and Efficiency that was published in 
20045). In this book, Katzenstein and Sil put the theory of Eclecticism at the forefront: “[S]eemingly incom-
patible strands of liberal, constructivist, and realist thought offer different insights in different languages 
that can be cautiously translated and productively combined in problem-focused research.” And: “For the 
purpose of defining and promoting eclectic approaches to Asian security, we rely here on the familiar triad 
of constructivism, liberalism, and realism as a usefully simplified way to address some foundational, con-
ceptual, methodological, and substantive debates in contemporary international relations research 
(Katzenstein and Sil 2004, 4 and 8).” Eclecticism relieves one from the doctrinaire parsimony of a single 
-ism, and enlarges the scope and depth of understanding especially of practitioners interested in finding 
the essence of events in international affairs, while having the three factors of power, values / efficiency 
and identity in mind, and asking themselves which phenomena can be best explained by these key fac-
tors.
At the point of writing, it seems to me that Eclecticism is best harmonized with Allison-Richardson 
analyses of understanding “states’ foreign policies and their consequences”.Rather than entering into this 
complex and philosophical debate on how the world is composed, by way of accepting a variety of factors 
(power, values / efficiency, and identity) as influencing the decision-making process, one can enjoy the 
rich wealth of IRT and reach a better understanding of foreign policy and the international situation. All 
three factors affect decision-making, and there is no need to draw a conclusion as to whether any one of 
them is exogenous or endogenic.
Eclecticism, though, has its flaws: theoretical instability and volatility in the application of relevant 
theory in a particular situation. With further studies Constructivism might develop into a theoretically 
stable and practically useful IRT where the role of individuals may also adequately be highlighted. But I 
leave this theoretical issue for future consideration and terminate my theoretical survey at this point and 
move to the last section of this paper, how a particular situation looks through the prism of the theoretical 
survey as described above.
The Rise of the Democratic Party and Yukio Hatoyama
Rational Actor, Organizational, and Governmental Models under the DPJ
The DPJ won a stunning victory in the House of Representatives elections on August 30, 2009 with an 
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overwhelming majority of 308. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) , the ruling party since 1955, saw its 
power interrupted for 10 months in 1993-94, but the defeat it suffered this time is generally perceived as a 
real system change in Japan. With that perception, Yukio Hatoyama assumed the position of prime minis-
ter on September 16. Yet, many expected that the new DPJ government would make little difference in 
foreign policy, since Japan has been wedded to its alliance with the United States for half a century and it 
faces more serious challenges from North Korea’s nuclear weapons and China’s rise.
The conventional view on the rational calculation of Japan’s foreign policy in the fall of 2009 would be 
as follows: From the point of view of the Rational Actor Model, there are few obvious issues to consider. 
The world is facing an economic downturn which started from the financial crisis in the fall of 2008. The 
crisis had global consequences, and the G20 became the critical framework to resolve this issue. China 
was least hit by the crisis, the US overcame the worst phase and its economy is already on the rise. In 
search of economic resiliency, Japan’s critical strategic agenda was how to face a China rising in all spheres 
and the United States with which Japan has maintained an alliance. Assuming that Japan’s foreign policy 
objectives are to create an international environment to let its economy gain strength and dynamism, cre-
ate sound and secure relations both with the US and China, Hatoyama’s government was expected to 
evaluate carefully historical relations with both, lessons to be learned from that history, the national pow-
er of these countries in all spheres, and the values that could be shared with each, and proceed to build 
trust based on all available information.
At the time of the writing of this paper, the Hatoyama government’s actions do not seem to have met 
these traditional rational calculations. Japan-US security relations in the post-9 / 11 situation were care-
fully crafted through consultations between the two administrations and resulted in an agreement “The 
Transformation and Realignment for the Future” reached in October 2005 and a “Road Map” announced 
in May 2006. One of the key agreements was the transfer of 8,000 US marines to Guam and the relocation 
of the Futenma US base to Camp Schwab near Henoko on the northern part of Okinawa Island. The US 
government under Obama made it clear that they were prepared to discuss the DPJ’s new policy, but they 
had no intention to revise these agreements reached with the LDP. Obama’s position was amply demon-
strated in his public statements during his visit to Tokyo in November6). The Hatoyama government’s re-
sponse has first been “indecisive”.The US side expressed displeasure. Ambassador John Roos reportedly 
expressed anger that the US side needs “an agreement expeditiously.” 7) But Hatoyama conveyed to Roos 
on December 15 that his government was going to postpone the decision on Futenma relocation until May 
20108).
Conventional analysis in explaining this situation is to look for the answer in Japan’s domestic politics, 
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as Waltz’s second IR “image” , or if one breaks down the domestic level image according to Allison, his 
Organizational and Governmental Actor Models. In fact there are reasons to invoke these domestic fac-
tors in analyzing contemporary Japanese politics.
How should we take into account the Organizational Behaviour Model? We can do this by analyzing 
the DPJ and where it stands in the context of overall Japanese politics. The DPJ was first established in 
1996 as a relatively minor party where Sakigake, former LDP members with a liberal orientation, and 
some former socialists cooperated. It enlarged considerably its strength and became the main opposition 
party in 1998, when influential members of the former LDP who had split from the party in 1993 joined it 
together with deputies supported by the labour union Rengo (Sankei 2009, 16). But it gained real power 
only in 2003 by uniting with Jiyuto, then led by Ichiro Ozawa, the chief architect in bringing down the LDP 
in 1993, who is determined to create a two party system in Japan (Sankei 2009, 20-21).
As this complicated history shows, the party is an amalgam of, on the one hand, former conservatives 
and, on the other, former socialists and Rengo supporters. The two groups differ fundamentally, particu-
larly on security policy, in which former LDP members in general favour proactive security policy whereas 
socialists and Rengo supporters favour a more pacifist orientation. That matrix is further complicated be-
cause, on the question of Article nine, both Yukio Hatoyama, a former LDP member, and Seiji Maehara, 
who never joined the LDP, argue that Japan should be able to exert the right of collective self defense. 
Their views are hardly reconcilable with those of former Japan Socialist Party members. Ichiro Ozawa has 
a unique view that under the present-day constitution Japan should be able to dispatch its Self Defense 
Forces acting as a normal military, provided that its activities are based on a UN resolution. The JDP has 
a structural weakness in producing a coordinated position on anything related to security fundamentals.
The DPJ stated in its manifesto its intent to seek “close and equal relations with the US” and to “go in 
the direction of revising the US realignment and the status of American bases in Japan and seek revision 
of the Status of Forces Agreement.” But in reality, it could not produce a comprehensive vision and real 
content of a new security policy toward the US. Internal party politics were too complicated to produce a 
unified vision. That is at least one reason for its “indecisiveness” .
How should we understand the Governmental Politics Model? There is first the question of the struc-
ture of the present-day coalition with the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and Kokumin Shinto. The JSP is a tiny 
survivor of one country pacifism, but it has a decisive voice in government policy formation because in the 
House of Councilors the DPJ has a majority only based on its coalition with the JSP. The failure of policy 
coordination with the JSP could entail a political stalemate because the DPJ government would become 
unable to pass any law which would be opposed by the LDP. In fact, Mizuho Fukushima’s statement on 
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December 3 that “the JSP might be forced to make a serious decision if the present agreement of relocat-
ing the Futenma base to Henoko is implemented” could have pressured Hatoyama toward his current 
“indecisive postponement” 9). The DPJ’s position may have become paralyzed; until it can gain a majority 
position in the House of Councilors election in summer 2010, it would not be able to implement a credible 
security policy.
Yukio Hatoyama’s idealism
The analysis so far developed gives many important insights on what is happening in Japan today, from a 
structural point of view. In short, domestic impediments prevent the development of rational thinking. But 
the introduction of another angle from the point of view of individual actors, namely Yukio Hatoyama in 
conjunction with Ichiro Ozawa, may offer deeper insight on why things are happening in the way they are 
in Japanese politics.
Yukio Hatoyama was born in 1947 in a wealthy family of the political elite, graduated from Tokyo 
University and received his PHD in science at Stanford. But upon coming back to Japan, he decided to go 
into politics like his younger brother Kunio Hatoyama and became a deputy from Hokkaido in 1986. He 
became one of the leading members of Sakigake, which split with the LDP in 1993.
In reviewing Hatoyama’s political platform, one is struck by his abstract idealism which may emanate 
from his grandfather Ichiro Hatoyama, an influential pre-war politician, who was elected as a deputy in the 
post-war parliament and became the president of the Liberal Party in 1946. But he was purged by the GHQ 
and the Party presidency was transferred to Shigeru Yoshida. When the purge ended in 1951, Yoshida did 
not agree to allow Hatoyama back into the leadership of the Liberal Party and Hatoyama formed a new 
party, the Japan Democratic Party, in 1954 and became prime minister until the end of 1956. Under 
Hatoyama in 1955, the Liberal Party and the Japan Democratic Party united in the LDP to establish what 
became known as the system of 55. Hatoyama succeeded in establishing relations with the Soviet Union 
in October 1956, which opened the way to Japan joining the United Nations in December.
During his life in exile after being purged by the GHQ, Ichiro Hatoyama read a book written by Count 
Richard Nikolas von Coudenhove-Kalergi entitled The Totalitarian State Against Man. Kalergi wrote that 
there was a need to respect the freedom of others just as there was a need to respect one’s own freedom; 
but for that equality is not enough because it might lead to a rigorous suppression of freedom; and frater-
nity was essential to balance the fallacies of freedom and equality; and for accomplishing democracy there 
was a need for a revolution for fraternity. Ichiro was deeply impressed with it and since then adopted fra-
ternity as his political motto (Mori 2009, 175-77). Kalergi was also well known as one of the founders of the 
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pan-European movement, establishing a philosophical basis for the European Union.
Yukio Hatoyama’s idealism based on Ichiro’s fraternity politics, emanating from Kalergi, is unmistak-
able. Three documents may be analysed. First Hatoyama wrote “My Political Philosophy” in the Septem-
ber edition of the monthly journal Voice10). He does not spare words to explain how his grandfather was 
attracted by the notion of fraternity, translated as yu-ai, which Kalergi advanced to protect democracy 
against the rising tide of Hitler and Stalin and Ichiro believed that it was exactly what was needed in post-
war Japan to prevent extremism and create a harmonious society. Hatoyama argued that this concept is 
precisely the way to resolve present-day Japanese problems also. In the area of foreign policy, Hatoyama 
wrote that yu-ai could be translated into the creation of the East Asian Community and he quoted Kalergi’s 
pan-European aspirations in his concluding remarks.
Hatoyama again expressed his fraternity policy at his UN General Assembly speech on September 
24. Quoting Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu’s speech on the occasion of Japan joining the United 
Nations in December 1956, he stated that Japan may act as “a bridge between the East and the West” 11),
 “My grandfather Ichiro, then Prime Minister, was an advocate of the concept of yu-ai, or “fraternity”. 
This yu-ai is a way of thinking that respects one’s own freedom and individual dignity while respect-
ing the freedom and individual dignity of others. There is a remarkable resonance between the con-
cept of the “bridge” in Mamoru Shigemitsu’s address and Ichiro’s concept of yu-ai, or “fraternity”.
Now, fifty-three years later, here at the very same United Nations General Assembly, I decalre with 
firm determination that Japan will play again the role of a “bridge” .
In bridging with Asia, Hatoyama again stressed in that speech, though abstractly, the need for devel-
oping an East Asian Community. Hatoyama reiterated Yu-ai and “bridge” as key concepts of his domestic 
and external policy respectively in his inaugural parliamentary policy speech on October 2612). Yu-ai was 
emphasized as the underlying concept to support his first objective, implementing a policy of “protecting 
life and people’s life first”.The entire foreign policy agenda was encapsulated as “Japan as a ‘bridge’ ” .
Hatoyama’s idealism and the reality of Japanese foreign policy formation
In the four months of his tenure as prime minister, it is becoming increasingly clear that there is a lack of 
concrete direction in Hatoyama’s idealism. The combination of idealistic abstract concepts and lack of 
concrete content appears to be creating a policy impasse. “Bridging” the differing positions with a spirit of 
“fraternity” is fine in abstract, but if void of contents, it might first create an illusionary expectation, and if 
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the expectation is not met, it could aggravate the situation.
What position should the Japanese government take when the Okinawa people’s wishes and US de-
fense policy on their Okinawa base differ irreconcilably? Hatoyama told Obama at their summit meeting 
on November 13, when faced with Obama’s urge to implement expeditiously the present agreement on 
Futenma, “trust me” and Obama replied “I trust you.” 13) But one month later, his unfulfilled assurance 
could well have aggravated the rift between the two leaders.
Likewise Hatoyama began emphasizing the notion of the East Asia Community. The notion is harm-
less as a general expression to seek “fraternity” in the region and as Japan’s wish to have friendly relations 
with all regional countries. But in reality one immediately faces a policy choice, for instance, whether Ja-
pan is in support of full scale US participation in major, if not all, regional organizations. Hatoyama’s article 
in Voice supported the establishment of a common currency in the East Asia Community. It is difficult to 
interpret this community with the presence of the US, which runs the global dollar economy. Foreign 
Minister Okada, in his public speech on October 7, stated that he did not envisage US participation in the 
East Asia Community14). Hatoyama’s “idealism” on the East Asia Community without careful consider-
ation of its contents could damage relations with the US given the obvious US displeasure on its exclusion 
from the regional community.
Another way of interpreting Hatoyama’s thinking is that he is convinced that his ideas correspond to 
the reality of Japanese domestic politics and surrounding international situation. He may genuinely be-
lieve that the time has come for Japan to take a more independent and assertive approach on the alliance, 
and the US is in a position to listen more carefully to what the Japanese side is seeking. The LDP has not 
done enough to represent the will of the Japanese people, this is why they lost the election, and there is a 
fundamental need to revisit the 2005-2006 agreement on the realignment. If Japan and the US are truly 
trustworthy allies, there should be rational thinking on the two sides of the Pacific Ocean to revisit the 
agreement reached by the LDP. It is a challenge to the conventional wisdom of rational thinking and at this 
point in time, it may be difficult to judge conclusively that this view, different from conventional LDP and 
security experts’ views, is entirely wrong. At any rate, from the point of view of an analytical tool, the com-
plexity of the situation might best be described through the individual analysis of Yukio Hatoyama.
In fact, Hatoyama expressed his view that Japan should bear the costs in order to establish an equal 
relationship with the United States. He wrote in a journal in 1996 when the DPJ was formed that “we 
should revise the security treaty with the US to ensure a new treaty without permanent deployment of US 
troops in Japan.” 15) In 2005 he proposed to revise Article 9 of the Constitution and establish a self defense 
armed force (Jieigun) , an idea which may underpin the vision of an alliance without permanent deploy-
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ment16). In fact some observers combine Hatoyama’s analysis of present day Japanese public opinion with 
his grandfather’s positioning toward the US. Ichiro criticized the US atomic bombing in September 1945 
and expressed US responsibility for Japan’s post-war reconstruction. Yukio said when he was party gen-
eral secretary that the true reason for Ichiro’s purge might have been this17).
One more person who should be considered in assessing the role of individuals in current DPJ poli-
tics is Ichiro Ozawa. Ozawa plays a key role in DPJ party politics both within the Party and in its relations 
within the coalition and with the opposition LDP. Ozawa’s weight does count in the present-day organiza-
tional and governmental power politics of the party, because he was most instrumental in conducting a 
successful campaign over the summer 2009 and he now occupies the crucial position of secretary general 
to prepare for the House of Councilors elections in the summer of 2010. Many observers argue that he is a 
real realist, sensible on all issues related to power; therefore, he is fundamentally America friendly and is 
well aware of the necessity of not antagonizing the US for Japan’s interest. At the same time, he has several 
political visions from which he will not retreat. Ozawa’s conviction that he is the heir to Kakuei Tanaka who 
opened diplomatic relations with China do not waiver, as his recent visit to Beijing with 143 DPJ parliamen-
tarians and 640 participants shows18). As stated, he also held a consistent view that full scale UN coopera-
tion is constitutionally justified. In contrast to his UN centrism, Ozawa may be considering that the alliance 
could proceed with a smaller deployment of US troops in Japan, as shown in his February 2009 statement 
“From military strategy, it suffices to have the Seventh Fleet deployed in the Far Eastern Region.” 19) DPJ’s 
power status is also deeply affected by major politicians’scandals. Ozawa has long been reported about his 
political scandals, and prosecution’s sharp move on January 13 2010 to investigate several offices related to 
him may indicate that he would soon be subjected to serious trouble20). Hatoyama and Ozawa are said to be 
on good terms, but Ozawa is also known for his autocratic approach. To what extent Hatoyama’s behaviour 
is influenced by or even conditioned by Ozawa is an important area for future analysis.
Ways ahead
By way of introducing individuals’ analysis, this paper opens a new perspective on Japanese politics not 
based on the structural rigidity of “rational thinking minus domestic impediments”.This paper does not 
deny the importance of structural factors both in 2009 world politics and Japanese domestic politics. But 
Hatoyama’s idealism, whether it is based on contentless utopian optimism or a search for independent and 
assertive diplomacy, in conjunction with Ozawa’s realism, is playing a real role in determining Japan’s 
foreign policy as well. Hatoyama’s political power and the role of Ozawa in DPJ politics will continue to 
play an integral part in Japanese foreign policy formation.
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Notes
1)  Jean Jacques Rousseau considered man in his natural state to be peaceful, gentle and with limited faculties, and 
juxtaposed him to states, which have no limitations in their increase in power, leaving individuals with no room to 
play in relationships among states. Girard questions: “How could one not see an enigma in the fact that the same 
thinker who justified the individual-citizen and modern democracy in the internal order, rejected them so totally in 
the external order (Girard 1999, 7) ?” 
2)  It is ironic because, as will be analyzed later, Waltz’s three images theory developed in Man, the State and War 
(1954) could have become the foundation for the clear-cut presence of individuals in recent IRT.
3)  According to Rosenau, leaders are for instance Winston Churchill and Vladimir Lenin, or Armand Hammer being 
a private actor (Rosenau 1990, 120-22). 
4)  Positivism is defined as: unity of science, distinction between facts and values, the fact that regularities of the 
social world can be discovered by theories like the natural world, and truth can be determined by appeal to the 
neutral fact (Smith 2001, 227).
5)  Two books published in 2003 may also be quoted. Mutiah Alagappa, Asian Security Order, which describes the 
three major conflicts in Asia as identity cum sovereignty: Taiwan, Korea and Kashmir (Alagappa 2003, 3-4) ; and 
John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno, International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific which refers to Real-
ism, Liberalism and Constructivism in order to bridge the gap between the Western IRT and Asian reality (Iken-
berry and Mastanduno 2003, 1-20).
6) Obama’s speech on November 14 stated: “We’ ve agreed to move expeditiously through a joint working group to 
implement the agreement that the two governments reached on restructuring US forces in Okinawa.” http://www.
asahi.com/international/update/1114/TKY200911140197.html access 2009/12/13
7)  Asahi Shinbun, December 5, 2009
8)  Asahi Shinbun, December 16, 2009
9)  Sankei Shinbun, December 4, 2009
10)  http://www.hatoyama.gr.jp/masscomm/090810_e.doc access 2009/11/02
11)  http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/assembly2009/pm0924-2.html access 2009/11/02
12)  http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/hatoyama/statement/200910/26syosin.html access 2009/11/02
13)  Asahi Shinbun, November 19 evening, 2009
14)  Sankei shinbun, October 8, 2009
15)  Asahi Shinbun, November 7, 2009
16)  http://www.hatoyama.gr.jp/tentative_plan/shian1.doc access 2009/11/02
17)  Asahi Shinbun, November 7, 2009
18)  Asahi Shinbun, December 11, 2009
19)  Sankei Shinbun, February 25, 2009
20)  Hatoyam’s scandal had also been reported widely after his election as PM. But his case was apparently related to 
his mother’s undeclared campaign donation and Hatoyama paid back ¥ 575 million as additional tax at the end of 
December 2009.
The Role of Individuals in International Relations Theory86
References
Alagappa, Muthiah (2003) (ed) Asian Security Order, Instrumental and Normative Features (Stanford: Stanford Uni-
versity Press) 
Allison, Graham and Zelikow, Philip (1999) Essence of Decision, Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Long-
man; original version: 1971) 
Byman, Daniel and Pollack, Kenneth (2001) ‘Let us now praise great men: Bringing the statesman back in’, Interna-
tional Security, Vol. 25 No. 4, 107-146
Girard, Michel (1999) ‘Individuals, Individualism and World Politics’ in Michel Girard (ed.) Individualism and World 
Politics (London: Macmillan) ,
Ikenberry, John and Mastanduno, Michael (2003) (eds) International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific (New 
York: Columbia University Press) 
Janis, Irving (1982) Groupthink (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company; original version: Victims of Groupthink, 1972) 
Katzenstein, Peter and Sil, Rudra (2004) ‘Rethinking Asian Security: A Case for Analytical Eclecticism’ in J J Suh, Peter 
Katzenstein and Allen Carlson (eds) Rethinking Security in East Asia; Identity, Power, and Efficiency (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press) 
Keohane, Robert (2005) After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, Prince-
ton University Press, first edition: 1984) 
Khong, Yuen Foong (1992) Analogies at War, Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and The Vietnam Decisions of 1965 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press) 
Machiavelli, Niccolo (1532) The Prince (Japanese translation: Tokyo, Chuko Bunko, 1975) 
Morgenthau, Hans (1985) Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, Sixth edition (New York: McGraw-
Hill, first edition: 1978) 
Mori, Seiho (2009) Hatoyama Yukioto Hatoyamake Yondai (Tokyo, Chukoshinsho La Clef) 
Mingst, Karen (2003) Essentials of International Relations (New York: W.W. Norton & Company; original version: 1999) 
Nicholson, Michael (1999) ‘Individuals and their influence on the international system’ in Michel Girard (ed.) Indi-
vidualism and World Politics (London: Macmillan) 
Richardson, James (2004) Crisis Diplomacy: The Great Powers since the Mid-Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press) 
Rosenau, James (1990) Turbulence in World Politics, a theory of change and continuity (Princeton: Princeton Univer-
sity Press) 
Sankeishinbun, Seijibu (2009) Minshuto Kaibo (Tokyo, Sankeishinbun) 
Smith, Steve (2001) ‘Reflectivist and Constructivist approaches to international relations theory’ in John Baylis and 
Steve Smith (eds) The Globalization of World Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 
Waltz, Kenneth N (1954) Man, the State, and War (New York: Columbia University Press; reprint 2001) 
Waltz, Kenneth N (1979) Theory of International Politics (Boston: McGraw Hill) 
Wendt, Alexander (1992) ‘Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics’, International 
Organization, Vol. 46 No. 2, 391-425
Wendt, Alexander (1999) Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 
